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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-1463 
 
______________ 
 
ELOY HERNANDEZ, 
                         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                Respondent  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(No. A026-502-624) 
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2019 
 
Before: CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 16, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Eloy Hernandez petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s decision to deny his motion to reopen 
the immigration proceedings. We find no error in that decision, and lack jurisdiction to 
consider Hernandez’s new arguments. So we will deny his petition for review. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Hernandez is a native and citizen of Cuba. He arrived in the United States in 1985 
and, four years later, became a lawful permanent resident. In January 1994, Hernandez was 
convicted in New York for selling a controlled substance. In 2002, he was convicted for 
receiving stolen property. And 2013 brought a conviction for conspiracy to commit theft 
by deception and a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  
Removal proceedings began in 2017, when the United States Department of 
Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear enumerating Hernandez’s crimes. Hernandez 
appeared before the Immigration Court, admitted all factual allegations asserted in the 
Notice, and requested a removal order. The Immigration Court granted Hernandez’s 
request for removal and both parties waived the right to appeal.  
Then, a year later, Hernandez changed course and moved to reopen the removal 
hearing when his 2013 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was 
vacated in state court and he instead pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous 
substance. Along with his motion to reopen, Hernandez applied for cancellation of removal 
under Section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), asserting that his 
2013 conviction no longer constituted an aggravated felony. Hernandez also applied for 
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relief under former Section 212(c) of the INA seeking to waive his January 1994 
conviction. He argued that the vacatur of his 2013 aggravated felony conviction, combined 
with the waiver of his January 1994 conviction, made him eligible for cancellation of 
removal. But the Immigration Judge rejected Hernandez’s arguments as 
“mischaracteriz[ing] the statutory and regulatory framework” and denied his motion to 
reopen. (A.R. at 39.) The BIA affirmed without opinion, stating that the Immigration 
Judge’s decision would be the final agency determination. 
II.  HERNANDEZ’S MOTION TO REOPEN WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
A.  Our Limited Jurisdiction 
 “Our jurisdiction is governed by Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242, 
8 U.S.C. § 1252, amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, Div. B, 119 
Stat. 231, which authorizes us to review final orders of deportation, exclusion, and 
removal.” Desai v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 695 F.3d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 2012). When, as here, 
“a petitioner is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, our 
jurisdiction is limited to addressing the jurisdictional prerequisite and evaluating 
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.” Id. (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). What is more, the 
BIA “retains unfettered discretion” to decline to reopen deportation proceedings. Desai, 
695 F.3d at 269 (quoting Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003)). So 
we may exercise only limited jurisdiction to determine whether the BIA has relied on any 
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erroneous legal premise. Pllumi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).1 
We see no such error.   
B.  The INA Precludes Hernandez’s Proposed Combination of Statutory Relief  
 Hernandez’s multiple convictions create a difficult path to avoiding removal. First, 
he must seek discretionary relief from deportation for his 1994 conviction. And indeed, he 
can. As the Immigration Judge correctly observed, “[i]t is undisputed that [Hernandez] 
remains eligible for 212(c) relief as this form of relief was available to him at the time of 
his January 7, 1994 conviction.”2 (A.R. at 40.) But 212(c) relief for his 1994 conviction 
does not impact the 2002 and 2013 convictions that separately render him removable under 
sections 237(a)(2)(B)(i) and 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA. So Hernandez seeks cancellation 
of removal under section 240A(a).3 (A.R. at 40 n.9.) 
 However, Hernandez is not permitted to obtain both forms of relief. The INA 
provides that an individual is not eligible for cancellation of removal if he “has been 
granted relief under section 1182(c) of this title [i.e., § 212(c) of the INA], as such section[ ] 
                                              
1 As the BIA adopted the Immigration Judge’s opinion as the final agency 
determination, we review only that decision. Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
2 When Hernandez was convicted of drug crimes in New York in 1994, § 212(c) of 
the INA then permitted a lawful permanent resident convicted of a deportable offense to 
seek discretionary relief from deportation if the prison term served was less than five years, 
even if the conviction arose from an aggravated felony. Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 
480, 486 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994)).  
3 Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
“Congress repealed § 212(c) relief altogether and replaced it with [§ 240A,] a provision 
that created a new and significantly narrower form of relief called ‘cancellation of 
removal.’” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). Section 240A “relief is now unavailable to any 
immigrant who was convicted of an aggravated felony, no matter the length of the 
sentence.” Id. 
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w[as] in effect before September 30, 1996.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6). For that reason, “an 
alien who has been granted relief under section 212(c) is ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.” Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2005). As a result, 
even assuming Hernandez gained relief from his 1994 conviction, he cannot seek relief 
from his later convictions.  
 What is more, we have observed that “a grant of 212(c) waiver does not nullify the 
underlying conviction and accordingly, it still exists for purposes of cancellation of 
removal analysis.” Guzman v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 770 F.3d 1077, 1089 (3d Cir. 2014). 
This is because “[t]he grant of a section 212(c) relief merely waives the finding of 
deportability rather than the basis of the deportability itself.” Rodriguez-Munoz, 419 F.3d 
at 248. So even if Hernandez were granted section 212(c) relief from deportability for his 
1994 conviction, and even if he could seek cancellation under § 240A, “that conviction 
would nonetheless remain an aggravated felony for purposes of precluding his 
application.” Id.; see also Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 353 (3d Cir. 
2010).4  
 In sum, Hernandez’s argument conflicts with the plain text of the INA. As a result, 
we will deny his petition for review. 
 
                                              
4 Hernandez raises other arguments, but he failed to exhaust those claims before the 
Immigration Judge. As a result, they are not preserved for our review. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d)(1); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n alien 
is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for relief if 
he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that claim.”).  
 
